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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXXVII May, 1949 Number 4
THE NEED FOR SOME CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
By Amny VANDENBOSCH*
"The charm of our constitutional ideal has now been long
enough wound up to enable sober men who do not believe in
political witchcraft to judge what it has accomplished, and is
likely still to accomplish, without further winding. The Consti-
tution is not honored by blind worship. The more open-eyed
we become, as a nation, to its defects, and the prompter we
grow in applying with the unhesitating courage of conviction
all thoroughly-tested or well-considered expedients necessary
to make self-government among us a straightforward thing of
simple method, single, unstinted power, and clear responsibil-
ity, the nearer will we approach to the sound sense and practi-
cal genius of the great and honorable statesmen of 1787."
-Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (1885)
Our country has recently gone through another presidential
and congressional campaign. In the election the American people
narrowly escaped a grave crisis. By a shift of 30,000 votes out
of a total of 48,680,416 votes cast in the election, Governor Dewey
could have been elected president, even though President Tru-
main had a popular plurality of over 2,000,000 votes. The Demo-
cratic Party carried Califoria by only 17,865, Illinois by 33,612,
and the populous state of Ohio by only 7,107 popular votes.
These three states have a combined electoral vote of 78, and
with the shift of these votes to the Republicans the vote in the
electoral college would have stood at 267 for Dewey and 225
for Truman.
Moreover, had Governor Dewey carried only two of these
three states there would have been. no majority in the electoral
college for either set of candidates and the election would have
been thrown into Congress, with a strong possibility of a dead-
lock in the House, and probably also in the Senate. The Con-
stitution provides that when a presidential election goes to the
House, each state casts one vote, which vote is determined by a
majority of its delegation. The delegations of three states are
* Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky. Ph.B.,
University of Chicago; Ph.D., Umversity of Chicago.
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equally divided between the Democrats and Republicans, and
hence would have no vote.;- the vote of four states would pre-
sumably go to the Democratic States Rights candidates (Gover-
nors Thurmond and Wright), while 21 states have preponder-
antlv Democratic and 20 states have preponderantly Republican
delegations in the present Congress. Thus there very likely would
have been no majority for any of the three candidates with the
highest electoral vote.'
These facts should be extremely disturbing to a democratic
people. Moreover, during the two preceding years, relations be-
tween the President and Congress had been very unsatisfactory,
due to the fact that the Republican Party commanded a majority
in both houses of Congress, while the President was a Democrat.
These two recent experiences suggest the desirability, if not the
urgency, of considering some basic constitutional reforms.
The first reform that suggests itself is a change in the svs-
tem of electing the President and the Vice-President. The in-
dictments against the electoral college are many Though this
is not required by the Constitution, the presidential electors in
every state are elected at large, hence the entire electoral vote.
of each.state goes to the party which receives the majority or tbe
plurality of the popular votes. Thus Governor Dewey carried
New York by only 60,959 popular votes out of 6,177,337 votes
cast, and though he received only 46 per cent of the total vote, he
nevertheless received all of New York's 47 electoral votes. On
the other hand, President Truman received all of Illinois' 28
electoral votes even though only 50.1 per cent of the total popular
vote of nearly 4,000,000 was cast for the Democratic ticket. Tlns
does not make ,sense.
Moreover, the number of people represented by each elec-
toral vote varies greatly from state to state, since each state
has as many electoral votes as it has Senators and Representa-
tives. -Since every state, regardless of how small its population,
has at least one Representative, and each state has two Senators
irrespective of its population, the smaller states recqive a far
larger number of electoral votes in proportion to their popula-
tion than do the populous states.. To take the two extremes for
example, Nevada has an .electoral vote for, ,each 37,000 of its
See thke:.interesting :article by Arthur Krook, on the editorial
page of the New York Times, January 18, 1949.
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population (1940 census), while New York has an electoral vote
for each 277,000 of its population. This gives Nevada seven and
a half times the representation per unit of population of New
York. By no stretch of the imagination can one call such unequal
representation democratic.
The Constitutional Fathers in the original provisions for
selecting the President and Vice-President developed an ingenious
method whereby they hoped that the foremost and the next fore-
most statesmen in the country would be almost automatically
selected President and Vice-President respectively, but the sys-
tem operated as they intended only a few times, and there is no
likelihood of its ever again operating in that way Through
political practices it has become a mere vote register or adding
machine, and as such it is exceedingly faulty As Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr. has recently declared, "The present system is
neither fair, honest, accurate, certain, nor democratic." 2 Three
times in our lstory candidates with fewer popular votes than
their leading opponents have taken the presidential office. In
1824 Jackson had 50,000 more popular votes than his nearest
rival, John Qumey Adams, but lost the election in the House,
which had to choose the President because there was no majority
in the electoral college. In 1876 Hayes won a majority in the
electoral college although he had received 264,292 fewer popular
votes than Tilden. Grover Cleveland, in 1888, lost the presidency
in spite of the fact that he had 100,000 more popular votes than
Benjamin Harrison, who received a majority in the electoral;
college.
The system is most undemocratic when the election is thrown
into Congress. The Constitution provides that in case of no
majority in the electoral college the House of Representatives-
shall choose the President from among the three candidates re-
ceiving the highest number of electoral votes, however, in thus
choosing the President, the Representatives do not vote indi-
vidually but all of the Representatives from each state vote as a
unit, andI a majority of all the states is necessary to a oh6ice. If,
unfortunately, an election is thrown into the' Houge, New Y6rk
with 15,000,000 people has no greater voting strength- than
"The Electoral 'College' v. The Will of the People." Statement
in the Senate of the United Statesi 'July 29; 1948. United ,States"Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washmngl n, 1948.
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Nevada with less than 150,000 residents. It is indeed a strange
system which gives a citizen of one state a hundred times greater
voting power than the citizen of another stateI In case of no
majority in the electoral college in the vote for Vice-President
the Senate must choose that officer from the two candidates re-
ceivinqgthe largest number of electoral votes. Since each state
has t' o Senators, regardless of its population, the same inequality
in voting would prevail in this election.
If then the original system planned by the Constitutional
Fathers cannot be restored and if the system has the grave
faults outlined above, what must be done I The first solution
that suggests itself is the abolition of the electoral college and
the election of the President and Vice-President by a nation-
,ide popular vote, without reference to the states. While there
is much to be said for it, it is politically impractical. To amend
the Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of
Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states. At the
present time thirteen states can prevent a proposed amendment
from becoming a part of the Constitution, and it is almost a dead
certainty that more than that number of the least populous
states would reject an amendment which would deprive them
of the very great advantages they enjoy under the present
system.
A proposal by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts avoids this
difficulty Under his proposed plan the electoral college would
be abolished but the system of electoral votes retained. The elec-
toral votes of each state would be distributed among the candi-
dates in proportion to the popular vote each receives. This
proposal would greatly reduce the danger of a candidate being
elected President who had failed to win a plurality of the popular
vote, but it would not wholly eliminate it. It would tend to dis-
perse presidential politics over all the states and discourage the
concentration of presidential politics in a few pivotal states. It
would tend to break up the one-party areas like the solid South.
It would reduce the subservience of presidential candidates and
political parties to minority groups who hold the balance of
power in pivotal states.
With the abolition of the electoral college and election by
a plurality of electoral votes there would seem to be no justi-
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fication for continuing the long period of time between the elec-
tion and the inauguration of the President. Before the Twentieth
Amendment was added to the Constitution four months elapsed
between the popular election and the inauguration of the Presi-
dent. This was wisely reduced by some six weeks by this amend-
ment which became a part o the Constitution in 1933. But
under the present provisions that period is still ten or eleven
weeks, depending upon the date of the popular election, which
is the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. In case
of a change of personnel in the office, especially if it also involves
a change of party, this is much too long a period in these critical
times. The defeated, retiring President has lost moral authority
and political leadership and will hesitate to make any major
decisions while the President-elect must wait nearly three months
before he can assume official leadership. The twilight period of
four months between the popular election of 1932 and the in-
auguration of President Franklin D Roosevelt on March 4, 1933,
during which the crisis deepened daily is still a painful memory
Why wait for a repetition of it 9 Should not the date of the
election be moved backward or the date of inauguration moved
forward 9
Another unfortunate aspect of our system is the fixed date
of elections, and the long campaign which is its inevitable con-
comitant. The last presidential campaign started in the early
months of 1948 and, of course, continued up to the election
on November 2. Few people expected the President and his
party to win. This long campaign under the circumstances was
exceedingly unfortunate in this past election, for it undermined
the President's authority as the spokesman for this country in
foreign policy just at a time when the world, and especially
one part of it, needed to know that the overwhelming majority
of Americans were of one mind in the basic objectives and
methods of our foreign policy The Republican leaders loyally
sought to remove the danger of giving the world an impression
of divided councils, but there was still Henry Wallace and the
Progessives, whose strength could not be definitely known until
after the election. To the problem here raised there is no solu-
tion so long as the present system of electing the president is
retained.
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But has not the time arrived for the consideration of more
drastic reforms of the executive office rather -than mere technical
corrections or minor reforms9 The presidency of the United
States is the most powerful and most responsible office m the
world. The incumbent wields a tremendous power and bears a
fearful responsibility As the population of this country has in-
creased and technology has complicated its problems and as
events have forced upon it world leadership, the office has become
steadily greater. Under our Constitutional system of a single
executive the President alone has the responsibility for making
the important decisions which must be made daily, and he alone
bears the crushing burden. Now two questions very properly
arise, namely, (1) should a nation of 150,000,000 people permit
a single person to make these momentous decisions, and (2) do
the American people have the moral right to impose such a
burden on any one man 2 Think of the decisions made by Presi-
dent Roosevelt during the war on his sole initiative and responsi-
bility as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and as the
sole spokesman for the United States in foreign policyI Should
an individual, however good, however noble, however wise, be
permitted to exercise so great an authority q
It will undoubtedly be objected that the President has a
cabinet which he should consult on important matters. As a
matter of fact the institution of the cabinet is unknown to the
Constitution, there are only heads of departments responsible
to the President. It may be argued that a Constitution is more
than a written document, that it includes usages and under
standings which have developed with time, and that the cabinet
is a part of the living, unwritten Constitution. That there is an
unwritten element in the Constitution none will deny, but there
is no evidence that we now have or during recent decades have
'had anything like a cabinet in the sense of the heads of depart-
ments serving collectively even as an advisory body to the Presi-
dent on matters of important policy The current spate of books
on the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration indicates the direct
opposite. Mr. Cordell Hull, who served as Secretary of State
during practically the entire twelve years of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, gives very specific testimony on this point m his
Menowrs. He writes
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"The President's cabinet filled, in general, a
very minor role in the formulation of foreign policy. I did
not find as much discussion of foreign relations at cabinet
meetings as might be supposed, except in certain instances
where a given question was very acute and was being
highly publicized, as in the later case of embargoes against
Japan.
"No decisions on foreign policy were taken by
cabinet voting during my tenure.
When it is remembered how many acute questions of foreign
policy arose during the Roosevelt admimstration this is indeed
an amazing statement. The President decided many of these
issues involving the weal or woe not only of this country but of
the world upon the advice of one man, his Secretary of State,
and such non-official advisors as he chose to consult t Only when
the President required appropriations or legislation for the
execution of his foreign policy did he have to go to Congress.
This is in sharp contrast with the British system or with
that of any of the other successful democracies of the world. Be-
fore Winston Churchill could take any important decision he had
first to consult the Cabinet and obtain its approval. The basic
decisions were the decisions of a group and not of an individual,
and that group, the cabinet, was composed of leading representa-
tive men of the largest parties. Moreover, this group was re-
sponsible to the House of Commons, and not periodically, but
constantly It was no mere accident that full-length reports on
the military and diplomatic situation during the war were made
periodically by the British Prime Minister to the House of Com-
mons. Americans as well as Britishers looked forward eagerly
and expectantly to these periodic, masterful reports. They were
the normal fruits of the British system of responsible gover
ment.
Our President and his department heads do not sit in Con-
gress and participate in its debates. When the President ad-
dresses Congress it is by his own choice, and having delivered
his message he is under no obligation to remain to debate the
issues he has presented nor answer questions from the floor. He
can retreat to the White House without the loss of a feather.
This tends to make the work of the Representatives and Sena-
tors very unsatisfactory and frequently gives the debates in
'Congress an artificial character. The real sponsors of the meas-
3I MEMoIsS OF CORDELL HULL, 203 (1943).
IKENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ures (for in these days practicallv all important proposals for
legislation originate in the executive branch of the government)
are not in Congress and thus cannot be engaged in debate.
Leaders of the opposition must be content with debating the
issues with secondary figures. Unfortunate results of this fact
are that it reduces the quality of Congressional debates, lessens
the interest of the public in Congressional proceedings and
lowers the attractiveness of Congress to men of great talent or
of highest aspiration.
A baneful consequence of our present system is that per-
sons who aspire to the Presidency shun Congress as if it were
a house of plague. The normal way to the Presidency is not
through Congress. Quite the contrary, service in Congress is
regarded as the most certain route to ineligibility Look at the
long list of brilliant Congressional leaders who aspired to but
failed to win the Presidency-Calhoun, Webster, Clay, Reed,
Bryan, and in our day, Barklev, Vandenberg and Taft have been
by-passed. When Bryan espoused Presidential aspirations he
left Congress and never returned to it. It is worthy of note that
M'r. Stassen, long an avowed candidate for the Presidency, has
deliberately stayed out of Congress, undoubtedly for the good
reason that it would very likely bar his way to the Presidential
nomination. When candidates for the Presidency have been
chosen from Congress they were not selected because of their
great abilities as Congressional leaders, but for much less worthy
reasons. Landon, Willkie, Dewey and Wallace-none of them
had had Congressional experience when nominated for the
highest political office in the country A life devoted to the
national legislative service is almost a -certain disqualification
for the Presidential office. It will undoubtedly be countered that
the system has given us a Lincoln, a Woodrow Wilson and a
Franklin D. Roosevelt, but these in the opinion of the writer
were the gifts of a kind Providence and not the normal fruits of
the system. Aside from the fact that a period of Congressional
leadership should be the very best preparation for so political
a position as that of the Chief Executive, the indirect Con-
gressional loss because of our system is considerable. Is it not
a pity that men like William Jennings Bryan, William Howard
Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, John W Davis,
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Al Smith, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell
*Willkie either did not serve in Congress at all or for only brief
perods 9 If the normal road to the Presidency is not through
Congress we need not be surprised if people have small regard
for Congress or that the quality of its membership should decline.
It would certainly seem to be desirable to give ex-Presidents
an ex-officio seat in the Senate, if the office is not modified so
that Presidential candidates will normally be drawn from Con-
gress. Due to the fact that our President is head of the State
as well as of the government people dislike to see an ex-President
engage in the rough and tumble of politics after his retirement
from this high office, but this attitude seems rather illogical.
One ex-President, John Quincy Adams, served long and honor
ably in the national Congress after his retirement, and several
others-Grant, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt-did not shun
political strife. After the nation has given these men an ex-
tensive, costly training in statecraft it seems a wanton waste not
to use their services further.
It is also imperative that measures be taken to improve the
quality of the so-called Presidential "cabinet" and to change the
character of its membership. It is too widely assumed that the
department heads are primarily administrative officials, and that
they must therefore be chosen with this ability chiefly in mind.
The work of the departments is now so vast and intricate that
a man coming from the outside cannot serve effectively as its
administrative official. That must be left to his subordinates,
most of whom would normally have had a long period of service
in the Department. The head of the Department is the Presi-
dent's chief advisor on policy on matters falling within the
jnrisdiction of his Department. Now an advisor to the President
on national affairs should have had a national political experi-
ence, and where else or more properly can that be acquired than
in Congress 9 Moreover, the Department heads must be in
frequent touch with Congressional leaders, and for this a previous
Congressional service is very valuable. In view of all this the
composition of the present "cabinet" represents an extra-
ordinary picture. There is in the present "cabinet'' 4 not a
single person who has had Congressional experience I
'February, 1949.
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One of the unfortunate developments of our system of gov-
ernment has been the frequent clashes between the President and
Congress. If the system leads to the type of men now in the
"cabinet" bow could it be otherwise? There are, of course, ad-
ditional reasons for hostility between the two. So long as we
have a different tenure of office for members of the House and
the Senate, and for the President, we shall off and on have either
one House in control of the opposition party or one party m con-
trol of Congress and with the President of a different party
By making the term of office of Senators and Representatives
four years that difficulty can be avoided. Serious consideration
should be given to this matter.
The whole character of the relation of the executive branch
of the government to the Congress, and with it the character
of the executive branch itself may be profoundly changed by
the mere device of requiring the heads of the Departments to
sit in Congress, with or without vote, but with the right to par-
ticipate in debate and with the obligation to answer questions
from the floor. In this case the President in selecting his "cabi-
net" members would have to give a great deal of consideration
to how well they can get along with Congress. A "cabinet"
officer who failed to get along with Congress would soon have
to be dropped. We might go a step beyond that and compel the
President to select his "cabinet" from the appropriate com-
mittee chairmen. In this event it would, of course, be necessary
to abandon the practice of selecting committee chairmen by the
seniority rule. If the latter expedient were adopted the Congress
would very probably drive the President into the background to
reduce him to a mere titular head. A better solution might be
the election of the President by Congress for a definite tenure,
which tenure should be the same for both houses of Congress.
This election by Congress might be held immediately after a new
Congress has been elected. This would give the President more
independence than if he were elected by a popular vote but had
to choose his "cabinet" members from Congress. The writer
does not pretend to have the answer to the problem here out-
lined, but he does believe that the time has arrived to examine
it anew and with seriousness of purpose. He is confident that
there is enough political sagacity among the 150,000,000
American people to find a solution.
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The office of Vice-President also calls for attention. While
the Presidency has been acclaimed as the greatest Constitutional
office in the world, the Vice-Presidency is an inconsequential
office. The Constitutional Fathers thought that they had set up
a device which would almost unerringly bring to the office the
second leading political figure m the country Except for the
first few elections that has not happened. In recent decades can-
didates for the office have been chosen in the most casual way
It is not a post that attracts outstanding men. When John
Adams was elected to the office he wrote his wife, Abigail, "My
country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant
office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagina-
tion conceived." In recent decades some experiments have been
made in clothing the office with a real function, but the results
have been disappointing. Representative Monrooney has sug-
gested that there should be two Vice-Presidents, a First Vice-
President to serve as an executive manager to the President, and
a Second Vice-President to preside over the Senate. If Congress
and the President feel that he needs an executive officer of the
nature it would be better to create the office by law, and to allow
the President to fill it as he now changes his cabinet members.
Probably the best solution is to abolish the office.
Reference has already been made to the Constitutional pro-
vision according each state two Senators irrespective of its popu-
lation. This was the price the small states exacted for entering
the Union. At the time the Constitution was drafted the differ-
ences in population among the states was not nearly as great as
it is now. Virginia, the most populous state, with a population
of 747,610 in 1790 had 12Y times the population of Delaware
with 59,000 inhabitants. In 1940 New York with 13,500,000 resi-
dents had 122 times the population of Nevada with 110,000.
What justification, other than political necessity, can there be
found for such gross inequalities in representation ' Nevada one
Senator for every 55,000 people, New York one for nearly 7,000,-
000 peopleI When it is remembered that the Senate has three
very important powers not shared by the Blouse, namely, approval
of appointments to superior offices, consent to the ratification
of treaties and trying impeachment charges, the anomaly becomes
apparent. And, as has already been pointed out, *this inequality
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of representation in the Senate is also reflected in the electoral
college to distort its function as a popular vote adding machine.
This inequality of representation in the Senate by the people
of the various states becomes increasingly unsatisfactory to the
industrial states, which are the states with the largest population,
as the practice of making grants-in-aid to the states is extended.
There is now a proposal before Congress to pass an appropriation
of $300,000,000 to be distributed among the states to aid them
in their educational programs. The less wealthy states have the
votes in the Senate while a very large part of the costs must
come from taxes paid by the populous, industrial states. One
set of states pays into the Federal .Treasury far more than it
receives in return, while another set of states receives far more
in grants than it contributes in taxes. If it were not so there
would be no sense in a Federal system of grants-in-aid.
Since no state can without its consent be "deprived of its
equal representation in the Senate, "5 there would be little chance
of modifying this Constitutional provision. If the small states
remain obdurate it may be necessary to threaten them with re-
ducing the Senate's powers by constitutional amendment. They
would probably rather suffer diminution in their representation
in the Senate than to see the powers of the Senate reduced.
Closely allied to this problem is the Constitutional require-
ment for a two-thirds vote of the Senate for consent to the ratifi-
cation of treaties. The Senators of one-third plus one, or 17,
of the least populous states can block ratification. These in 1940
had a combined population of less than 12,000,000. Thus it was
mathematically possible for a majority of the voters out of a
total population of about 12,000,000 to defeat the wishes of the
remaining 120,000,000 people of the country I Should Alaska and
Hawaii be admitted as states there would be two more small
states with an exaggerated representation m the Senate. At the
time of the 1940 census Hawaii had a population of 423,330 and
Alaska only 72,524.
On the other extreme the 17 most populous states had in
1940 a total population of 92,000,000, and thus it would take a
majoritv of votes of this population to prevent the ratification
of a treaty desired by the remaining less populous states. It
'U. S. CONST. Art. V
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must, of course, be emphasized that these are only mathematical
possibilities and practically are highly improbable eventualities.
The above illustrate the extreme range. Nevertheless, they do
point out how undemocratic the system is. It is not likely that
the disparity in the populations of the states will decrease, it is
more likely to increase. The population estimate of the Bureau
of the Census for 1948 indicates a strong trend of population
toward the industrial states. According to these figures the six
states of New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, California, and
Texas now have a combined population of 58,800,000 out of a
total national population of 146,000,000, while the six least
populous states (Nevada, Wyoming, Delaware, Vermont, Mon-
tana and Idaho) have a population of 2,130,000. The first group
of states, though it has 30 times the population of the second,
has the same number of Senators. The first group has one
Senator for about every 5,000,000 people, whereas the second
group has one Senator for every 350,000 people.
The provision of the Constitution with respect to Con-
gressional participation in treaty-making is odd in that on the
one hand it leaves out the House but requires a two-thirds vote
by the Senate. The President and Senate can thus make treaties
which are legally binding on the United States but which, when-
ever an appropriation or legislation is required, cannot be carried
out without th.e subsequent cooperation of the House. Is the
House morally bound in such cases to pass the required appro-
priation or legl~ation 2 Suppose it refuses to do so 9 In that case
the Uhited States would be bound under international law but
unable to carry out its international obligation because of our
Constitutional arrangements. This would put us in an awkward
position. So far the House has obediently performed its part,
but at times with a show of restiveness.
On the other hand the two-thirds requirement has led the
President to resort to the use of executive agreements, which are
not sent to the Senate for approval, rather than xun the hazards
and delays of, the two-thirds yote. requirement. This practice
has become very noticeable in the last decades.6 The result is
that this requirement, which was incorporated in the Constitu-
tion to insure Congressional control over foreign relations, de-
"See the speech by Senator Langer in the Senate on March 4,
1948. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 94, pp. 2173-4.
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feats its purpose. Because of it we have less rather than more
democratic control over foreign policy In view of all of these
considerations it would seem advisable to amend the Constitution
so as to require a mere majority vote, but of both Houses, for
consent to the ratification of treaties.
This change would not solve the whole problem of the con-
trol of American foreign policy Under present conditions it is
absolutely necessary to give the President wide discretion m the
conduct of foreign policy This is unavoidable, but so great a
power should always carry with it a commensurate responsibility
Power should always be linked with responsibility How to
obtain this under our system of an independent executive is a
problem to which there may be no solution. This pressing prob-
lem may in the end compel an abandonment of the principle of
the separation of powers.
Before leaving this general subject it should be pointed out
that since proposed amendments to the Constitution must be
ratified by three-fourths of the states, 13 states can prevent
ratification. The ratification by Nevada counts equally with the
ratification by New York. The 13 least populous states have a
combined population of about 7,000,000. Thus a majority of
7,000,000 people in these states can hold up an amendment de-
sired by the 139,000,000J
There is still one other strange situation m a country which
prides itself on its democratic system of government, and that
is that 900,000 people living in its capital have no participation
in government on any level, unless they maintain a legal or voting
residence in one of the states, which for most people living in
the District of Columbia is utterly impractical. This is an anom-
aly The District of Columbia now has a population greater than
the population of any one of the 13 least populous states and
greater than the, combined population of the three smallest
states. The latter;-have over 6 per cent of the total representa-
tion in the Senate, while the District has no representation in-
either House. Neither does it have any control over its local
government. The residents of the capital of the greatest democ-
racy in the world- are disenfranchised. Surely this calls for
speedy remedy.
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This article will undoubtedly cause resentment among some
readers, This. is quite to be expected. The writer regrets tins
but he nevertheless feels strongly that these issues should be
discussed frankly and seriously Many of the weaknesses he
points out have been pressed by others. The suggestions for
changes are made with the object of making the Constitution
more democratic, not less, of increasing governmental responsi-
bility, not diminishing it. There can be no valid objection to
the objectives. Whether the suggestions made are likely to at-
tain them is open to debate, of course.
